Executive chairman of Strategy (formerly MicroStrategy), which held 842,138 BTC at a $75,419 average cost as of August 2026. He sells no course - only a thesis and a listed equity - but carries a settled 2000 SEC fraud injunction and a $40M DC tax settlement.
Almost every person reviewed on this site sells information. A course, a mastermind, a coaching call, a newsletter with an upsell ladder. That is the standard shape of the online money guru, and it makes them easy to grade: you look at the price, the refund policy, the testimonials, the income claims, and you check whether the documented reality matches the marketing.
Michael Saylor does not fit that shape at all. He has no course. There is no $997 program, no $50,000 mastermind, no Discord with a monthly fee. What he sells is a thesis about bitcoin and a listed equity vehicle for expressing it, and he gives away the thesis for free while the vehicle trades on Nasdaq under a ticker that any brokerage account can buy. That combination makes him simultaneously more legitimate than the typical guru and, in a specific way, harder to assess. There is no funnel to critique. There is instead a public company with audited financial statements, a capital structure of unusual complexity, and a founder who has been personally enjoined by the SEC from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Both of those things are true, and both matter. This review works through what is documented, what is claimed, and where the two diverge.
Who They Actually Are
Michael J. Saylor, 61 as of April 2026 according to Strategy's proxy statement, co-founded MicroStrategy in 1989 as an enterprise business-intelligence software company. He took it public in June 1998. Today the company is named Strategy Inc, trades on the Nasdaq Global Select Market as MSTR, and is headquartered at 1850 Towers Crescent Plaza in Tysons Corner, Virginia. Saylor's title is Chairman of the Board and Executive Chairman. Phong Q. Le is President and Chief Executive Officer.
The pivot that made Saylor a public figure outside enterprise software happened on 11 August 2020. That day MicroStrategy filed a Form 8-K announcing it had purchased 21,454 bitcoins at an aggregate purchase price of $250.0 million, inclusive of fees and expenses. The same 8-K disclosed a simultaneous modified Dutch auction tender offer to buy back up to $250.0 million of its own class A shares. That is the origin point of what is now the largest corporate bitcoin position in the world.
The scale six years later is not in dispute, because the company reports it weekly in Form 8-K filings. As of 2 August 2026, Strategy held 842,138 bitcoin at an aggregate purchase price of $63.51 billion, an average purchase price of $75,419 per coin inclusive of fees and expenses. At 30 June 2026 the balance sheet carried $49.67 billion of digital assets against total assets of $52.56 billion. The software business that gave the company its name produced $122.4 million of revenue in the second quarter of 2026 and $246.7 million in the first half. Bitcoin is not a side allocation at Strategy. Bitcoin is approximately 95 percent of the balance sheet, and the software business is a rounding error attached to it.
Saylor's economic position is documented in the 2026 proxy statement. He beneficially owns 372,575 shares of class A common stock and 19,616,680 shares of class B common stock, which is 99.9 percent of the class B. Class B carries ten votes per share. That gives him 19,989,255 shares in total, 6.1 percent of the class A economic interest as the proxy tabulates it, and 37.6 percent of total voting power. The Q2 2026 10-Q states the class B position alone accounted for approximately 35.8 percent of total voting power at 30 June 2026. He controls the company without owning most of it, which is a normal dual-class arrangement and is disclosed plainly in both the proxy and the risk factors.
His base salary is $1. That is not a rhetorical flourish. The proxy records that in September 2014, at Saylor's own request, the Compensation Committee reduced his annual base salary to $1, eliminated his incentive cash bonus arrangement, and has left the salary at $1 at his request in each of February 2025 and February 2026. His compensation is his equity. Whatever else is true about him, he is not extracting a salary from shareholders.
Outside the company, Saylor founded Saylor Academy, a Washington DC nonprofit established in 1999 that has run a Free Education Initiative since 2008, publishing hundreds of free, self-paced, college-level online courses that are openly licensed and accessible without payment. This is a genuine, long-running, verifiable thing that predates bitcoin by more than a decade, and it deserves to be weighed.
Forbes puts his net worth at $3.3 billion as of 4 August 2026, ranking him #1302 globally, with the source of wealth listed as cryptocurrency and self-made. His last publicly disclosed personal bitcoin position dates to October 2020, when he said he had personally bought 17,732 bitcoins for $175 million at an average price of $9,882. He has approximately 5.1 million followers on X.
What They Claim
Saylor's public case has three parts, and it is worth separating them because they carry very different evidentiary weight.
The first is the monetary thesis: that bitcoin is the hardest, most durable form of property yet invented, that fiat currency is a melting ice cube, and that any entity holding cash is losing purchasing power by default. This is an opinion about the future of money. It is not falsifiable in the near term and he is entitled to it.
The second is a specific price projection. At the Bitcoin 2024 conference in Nashville in July 2024, Saylor presented what he called his base case: bitcoin at $13 million per coin by 2045, implying a market capitalization around $280 trillion and requiring roughly a 29 percent compound annual return for two decades. His bear case was $3 million and his bull case was $49 million. He has since floated other long-horizon numbers. These are model outputs, not forecasts with any track record behind them, and Saylor presents them as scenarios rather than promises. That framing is fairer than most guru price targets, but the numbers still travel through social media stripped of the framing.
The third is the corporate claim: that Strategy's bitcoin acquisition strategy is accretive to common shareholders. The company measures this with proprietary KPIs it invented, primarily Bitcoin Per Share expressed in satoshis, BTC Yield, BTC Gain, and BTC Dollar Gain. The claim is that by issuing equity and preferred stock above the value of the underlying bitcoin, the company buys more bitcoin per share than existed before, so every holder ends up with more satoshis backing each share.
And for a long stretch, there was a fourth claim, stated repeatedly and emphatically: that the company would never sell its bitcoin. That one is no longer operative, and the way it stopped being operative is the most important thing in this review.
What Is Actually Documented
Start with the bitcoin per share claim, because the company's own numbers support it while also showing it decaying.
Assumed Diluted Shares Outstanding rose from 281.7 million at 31 December 2024 to 401.3 million at 30 June 2026, an increase of about 42 percent. Over the same window, Bitcoin Per Share rose from 158,826 satoshis to 210,824 satoshis, an increase of about 33 percent. So the per-share bitcoin backing genuinely went up while the share count went up faster in absolute terms but slower relative to the bitcoin pile. On the company's own metric, the strategy worked mechanically.
But the metric is losing power. BTC Yield was 5.0 percent in Q2 2026 against 8.7 percent in Q2 2025, and 8.1 percent for the first half of 2026 against 19.7 percent for the first half of 2025. The 10-Q gives the reasons explicitly, and they are honest ones: a larger bitcoin base makes percentage gains harder, the class A stock traded at a lower premium to underlying bitcoin, and an increasing share of common stock sales went to purposes other than buying bitcoin.
More importantly, Strategy itself discloses the metric's central limitation, and it is a limitation most retail commentary ignores. From the Q2 2026 10-Q, describing the preferred series and convertible notes: these securities "rank senior to our class A common stock, and would entitle their holders to claims on our assets (including bitcoin) senior to those of holders of our common stock if we were to liquidate; as a result, additional bitcoin acquired using the proceeds from the sale of such instruments may not accrete to common shareholders."
That is the company saying, in its own filing, that its headline accretion metric can overstate what common shareholders actually own. The preferred series do not increase the share count, so issuing them raises BTC Yield by construction, but they sit ahead of common in the queue.
How big is that queue? At 30 June 2026, total liabilities were $7.24 billion, of which $6.71 billion was convertible senior notes at principal. The preferred stock sat in mezzanine equity at a carrying value of $14.44 billion with a redemption value and liquidation preference of $15.46 billion, up from $8.03 billion at 31 December 2025. So in roughly six months the preferred liquidation preference nearly doubled.
Now the results. Strategy adopted ASU 2023-08 on 1 January 2025, which requires marking bitcoin to fair value through net income. The consequence is enormous reported volatility, and the company says so. Its own disclosed sequence: a $5.91 billion unrealized loss in Q1 2025, a $14.05 billion unrealized gain in Q2 2025, a $3.89 billion unrealized gain in Q3 2025, a $17.44 billion unrealized loss in Q4 2025, a $14.46 billion unrealized loss in Q1 2026, and an $8.32 billion unrealized loss in Q2 2026.
For the first half of 2026 Strategy reported a net loss of $20.76 billion, of which Q2 alone was $8.22 billion. After $630.2 million of preferred dividends, the loss attributable to common stockholders for the half was $21.39 billion, or $62.32 per basic share. Retained earnings of $6.32 billion at the end of 2025 became an accumulated deficit of $15.20 billion by 30 June 2026.
And the cost basis is underwater. The 6 July 2026 8-K states plainly that as of 30 June 2026, the cost basis of Strategy's bitcoin exceeded the fair value of its holdings, and that as a result the company recorded a valuation allowance fully offsetting the associated deferred tax benefit. At 24 July 2026 the company held 843,775 bitcoin with a market value of $54.14 billion at a bitcoin price of $64,164, against an average purchase price of roughly $75,476. That is an unrealized loss of about 15 percent on the whole position.
The Business Model
This is the section that matters, because Strategy is not a company that bought bitcoin with spare cash. It is a company whose actual business is manufacturing and selling securities, and using the proceeds to buy bitcoin.
The machine has three inputs. First, at-the-market equity programs, which let the company sell new class A shares continuously into the open market. Second, convertible senior notes, historically at very low or zero coupons because buyers were paying for the embedded equity option on a wildly volatile stock rather than for yield. Third, and now dominant, a stack of perpetual preferred securities with names built around the STR prefix: STRF at 10.00 percent, STRK at 8.00 percent, STRD at 10.00 percent, STRE, and STRC, a variable-rate series.
The convertible notes outstanding at 30 June 2026 illustrate how cheap the early financing was: $1.01 billion of 0.625 percent notes due 2028, $1.50 billion of zero percent notes due 2029, $800.0 million of 0.625 percent notes due 2030, $2.00 billion of zero percent notes due 2030, $603.7 million of 0.875 percent notes due 2031, and $800.0 million of 2.25 percent notes due 2032. Borrowing billions at zero percent to buy an appreciating asset is, if the asset appreciates, close to free money. That was the trade.
The preferred stack is a different animal, and this is where the model changed character. Preferred dividends are paid in cash, not in bitcoin, and they are perpetual. As of both 30 June 2026 and 24 July 2026, the company disclosed that its current expected annual preferred stock dividend payments and interest expense were approximately $1.76 billion in aggregate, assuming a 12.00 percent rate on STRC.
Set that against the operating business. Total revenue for the first half of 2026 was $246.7 million. Annualise that generously and you get something under $500 million of gross revenue, before any cost of revenue or operating expense, against $1.76 billion of annual cash obligations. The software business cannot fund the capital structure. It is not close.
So where does the cash come from? Until recently, from selling more securities. In December 2025 the company established a USD Reserve, a cash pile explicitly earmarked for preferred dividends and debt interest. On 29 June 2026 the board formalised it into what Strategy calls the Digital Credit Capital Framework, with five components: a board-approved USD Reserve policy requiring a minimum of twelve months of coverage for dividends and interest, a revised STRC dividend policy, a $1.0 billion repurchase program for the preferred securities, a $1.0 billion repurchase program for class A common stock, and, critically, a BTC Monetization Program under which the company may sell bitcoin to generate up to $1.25 billion of proceeds to fund the reserve.
Read that again. The company built a formal, board-approved mechanism for selling bitcoin to pay preferred dividends.
And it has used it. The Q2 2026 10-Q records 1,395 bitcoin sold during the quarter at an average of $59,663, with the filing noting the proceeds funded preferred dividend payments. The 6 July 2026 8-K discloses 1,363 bitcoin sold between 29 and 30 June at $59,256 and a further 2,225 bitcoin sold between 1 and 5 July at $60,773, both to fund distributions on preferred stock and replenish the reserve. The 3 August 2026 8-K discloses 1,638 more bitcoin sold between 27 July and 2 August at an average of $63,957, with $52.4 million funding preferred dividends and $52.3 million funding STRC buybacks.
Every one of those sales was executed below the company's average cost of roughly $75,419. Strategy is selling bitcoin at a realised loss to pay cash dividends on securities it issued to buy bitcoin. That is the actual mechanic in August 2026, and it is documented in the company's own filings rather than inferred.
There is a further signal in STRC. The dividend rate was set at 12.00 percent per annum effective for periods on or after 16 August 2026, and the 3 August 2026 8-K states that management does not intend to recommend a change from 12.00 percent until STRC demonstrates sustained trading at or near its $100 stated amount. The 10-Q discloses that subsequent to 30 June 2026 the company repurchased 288,930 STRC shares at an average of approximately $86.52. A perpetual preferred paying 12 percent and trading at 86 cents on the dollar is the market pricing meaningful credit risk into the top of Strategy's capital stack.
Now the valuation question, and here the arithmetic is worth doing carefully because the commonly quoted number is misleading in the investor's favour.
At the close on 3 August 2026, MSTR traded at $94.86 with a market capitalisation of $36.48 billion, against a 52-week range of $81.81 to $414.36. Divide that market cap by the $49.67 billion of bitcoin carried at 30 June 2026 and you get roughly 0.73, which is where the widely repeated claim that MSTR trades at a 27 percent discount to its bitcoin comes from. It sounds like buying bitcoin on sale.
But common equity does not own the bitcoin. It owns what is left after the senior claims. Add the $7.24 billion of total liabilities and the $15.46 billion preferred liquidation preference to the $36.48 billion of market capitalisation and you get about $59.2 billion of total claims against $49.67 billion of bitcoin, which is roughly 1.19 times. On a whole-capital-structure basis the market was still paying a premium to bitcoin, not a discount. The 0.73 figure is arithmetically correct and analytically incomplete, and anyone using it as a buy signal should understand which number they are looking at.
One more structural risk is worth naming because Strategy names it. In October 2025 MSCI proposed excluding from its Global Investable Market Indexes companies whose primary business involves digital asset treasury activity and whose digital holdings are 50 percent or more of total assets, which would have captured Strategy. On 6 January 2026 MSCI announced it would not implement the proposal for the February 2026 index review, but said it intends to open a broader consultation on the treatment of non-operating companies. That is a deferral, not a resolution, and index exclusion would force mechanical selling by passive funds.
What They Sell, and What It Costs
Nothing, in the guru sense. This needs stating clearly because it is the single largest point in Saylor's favour on a site that exists to catalogue information sellers.
There is no Michael Saylor course. There is no coaching program, no certification, no paid community, no affiliate scheme, no ten-thousand-dollar mastermind in Dubai. His conference talks are free on YouTube. Strategy has published bitcoin-for-corporations material without charge. Saylor Academy has given away college-level courses for free since 2008. He does not have a paid newsletter selling trade alerts.
What he sells instead is a thesis and a security.
The thesis is free, which sounds generous and mostly is, but free is not the same as disinterested. Saylor's public advocacy directly serves a position he and his company hold. When he tells the world that bitcoin is the superior treasury asset and that selling it is a mistake, he is talking his book on a scale most people never approach: 842,138 corporate coins and, as last disclosed, 17,732 personal ones. This is not hidden and it is not illegitimate. It is simply the correct lens for reading anything he says.
The security is the real product, and it has a real price. MSTR at $94.86, or preferred shares yielding 8 to 12 percent, or convertible notes. When you buy MSTR you are not buying bitcoin. You are buying a leveraged, actively managed, permanently dilutive claim on bitcoin that sits behind $7.24 billion of debt and $15.46 billion of preferred, run by a controlling shareholder with 37.6 percent of the votes, in a company that has adopted a formal program for selling bitcoin to service the securities above you. Every one of those clauses is documented in the filings, and every one of them is a difference from simply owning bitcoin.
So the honest answer to "what does it cost" is: nothing to listen to him, and whatever the market price of MSTR is to act on him.
Red Flags
The 2000 SEC accounting fraud settlement. On 14 December 2000 the SEC filed a settled civil injunctive action against MicroStrategy's three top officers, Saylor, co-founder Sanjeev Bansal, and former CFO Mark Lynch, alleging the company materially overstated revenues and earnings from its June 1998 IPO through March 2000 contrary to GAAP, reporting positive net income when it should have reported net losses. Without admitting or denying the allegations, the defendants consented to final judgments permanently enjoining them from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5 and 13b2-1. Saylor personally disgorged $8,280,000 and paid a $350,000 civil penalty. The restatement reduced revenues by approximately $66 million of the $365 million reported over three years. The stock fell from $260 to $86 in a single day on 20 March 2000 and to $33 by 13 April 2000. The settlement carried no admission of wrongdoing and the SEC did not bring criminal charges, but a personal antifraud injunction is a serious matter and belongs in any assessment of a person now steering tens of billions of dollars of public shareholder capital into a single volatile asset.
The 2022 District of Columbia tax case. The DC Attorney General sued Saylor and MicroStrategy in August 2022 under the District's False Claims Act, alleging that Saylor lived in DC from 2005 while claiming residency in lower-tax Florida or Virginia, evading more than $25 million in DC income taxes, and that MicroStrategy facilitated it through address and withholding filings. On 3 June 2024 the parties settled for $40 million, which the Attorney General described as the largest income tax recovery in District history and the first case brought under DC's amended False Claims Act tax provision. Saylor and MicroStrategy did not admit liability. Saylor publicly disputed the allegations, said he settled to avoid the burdens of litigation, and maintained that Florida remains his home. State the case as what it is: a settled civil matter with no admission and no finding of liability, resolved for a very large sum.
The reversal on never selling. For years the message was that the bitcoin would never be sold. In 2026 Strategy began selling it, formalised a BTC Monetization Program to keep selling it, and disclosed that the proceeds fund preferred dividends. Positions can change with circumstances, and changing them is often correct. But anyone who took "never sell" as doctrine and levered themselves accordingly took on a risk that the person issuing the doctrine has now declined to take.
Structural risk that retail commentary consistently misses. The 0.73 mNAV headline ignores $22.7 billion of senior claims. The BTC Yield metric flatters preferred issuance by construction, a limitation Strategy itself discloses. Both make the equity look safer than the filings support.
Financing dependence. The model requires continuous access to capital markets. Strategy's own risk factors acknowledge it may be unable to raise capital or use bitcoin as collateral, particularly during market instability or after a significant bitcoin decline, which is precisely when it would most need to.
Talking his book at maximum volume. None of the above is deception. But an executive chairman with 37.6 percent of the votes, a personal bitcoin position, and five million followers, telling retail investors that bitcoin only goes up over long horizons, is a person whose incentives and message point the same direction. Weight his statements accordingly.
Green Flags
He does not sell information. No course, no mastermind, no coaching, no affiliate funnel, no gated Discord. On a site full of people monetising attention through paid programs, this is a real and unusual distinction.
Everything material is in SEC filings. Holdings, average cost, sales, dilution, debt, preferred, losses, custodians, risk factors. Weekly 8-Ks, quarterly 10-Qs, KPMG as auditor. You do not have to take his word for anything. This review was built almost entirely from primary documents that anyone can pull from EDGAR for free.
He takes a $1 salary. Reduced at his own request in September 2014, with the incentive cash bonus arrangement eliminated, and reaffirmed at $1 in February 2025 and February 2026. His outcome is tied to the equity, alongside other shareholders.
The company discloses against its own interest. The 10-Q explicitly warns that bitcoin bought with proceeds from senior securities may not accrete to common shareholders. That is Strategy undercutting the strongest reading of its own headline metric, in writing, in a filed document.
Saylor Academy. A nonprofit founded in 1999 offering free, openly licensed, college-level courses since 2008, requiring no payment to access course content. Twenty-plus years of genuinely free education, entirely separate from bitcoin.
He is exactly who he says he is. Real name, real company, real address, real regulator, real auditor, real 61-year-old executive chairman with a documented three-decade track record. There is no invented backstory, no rented Lamborghini, no fabricated income screenshot. Whatever the argument about his strategy, the person is verifiable to the last detail.
Who This Is Actually For
Saylor's material is genuinely useful to a narrow group.
Corporate finance and treasury professionals evaluating digital asset allocation will find Strategy's filings the most detailed public case study in existence, including the parts that went wrong. The Digital Credit Capital Framework, the USD Reserve policy, the BTC Monetization Program, and the deferred tax valuation allowance are all real lessons in what happens when a leveraged treasury position goes underwater.
Investors who want leveraged bitcoin exposure inside a tax-advantaged account that cannot hold spot bitcoin, who have read the capital structure, and who understand they sit behind $22.7 billion of senior claims. That is a legitimate, informed trade. It is just not the trade most MSTR buyers think they are making.
People who want to understand the bitcoin maximalist argument in its strongest and most articulate form. Saylor states it better than almost anyone, and he does it for free.
Anyone studying financial engineering. The convertible arbitrage bid, the ATM mechanics, the perpetual preferred stack, the invention of proprietary KPIs to frame a strategy: this is a masterclass in capital markets structuring, whatever you conclude about its wisdom.
Who Should Avoid Them
Anyone who thinks MSTR is a way to own bitcoin. It is not. It is a leveraged claim on bitcoin sitting behind debt and preferred, at a whole-capital-structure premium of roughly 1.19 times as of early August 2026, in a company that sells bitcoin to pay its dividends. If you want bitcoin, spot bitcoin or a spot ETF gives you bitcoin without the corporate layer.
Anyone thinking of imitating this personally. This is the most important warning in the review, and it is the question the site's readers actually ask. Strategy's returns did not come from conviction. They came from access to institutional capital markets that individuals do not have: at-the-market equity programs, zero-coupon convertible notes bought by volatility arbitrage desks, and perpetual preferred securities sold to yield investors. An individual cannot issue perpetual preferred stock. An individual cannot borrow at zero percent with no maintenance margin. An individual who levers into bitcoin faces margin calls that Strategy structurally does not, which is exactly why Strategy could survive a 15 percent underwater position while a retail borrower at similar leverage would have been liquidated. The strategy is not replicable by an individual, and treating "Saylor is buying, so I will borrow and buy" as a plan is a category error with real consequences.
Anyone who cannot sit through a $20 billion half-year loss. Strategy reported exactly that in the first half of 2026, with an accumulated deficit of $15.20 billion at 30 June, and the stock ranged from $414.36 to $81.81 over twelve months. If that volatility would force you to sell, this is not for you.
Income investors reaching for the preferred yields. STRF at 10 percent, STRD at 10 percent, STRC at 12 percent look attractive until you note that they are perpetual, that the STRC dividend is not guaranteed and is set at the board's discretion, that STRC has been trading around $86 against a $100 stated amount, that the company has stated it will not necessarily raise the rate merely because the security trades below stated value, and that the dividends are being funded partly by selling bitcoin at a loss. A 12 percent yield on a security trading at 86 is the market telling you something.
Anyone who wants the free content without the interest disclosure. Saylor's advocacy is sincere and it is also self-interested. Both.
The Verdict
Michael Saylor is not a scam and this review should not be read as calling him one. He is a real executive of a real, audited, regulated public company, he sells no information product, he takes a $1 salary, he has funded free education for over two decades, and every material claim about his company can be checked against filings that anyone can download. Measured against the population this site normally reviews, that is an enormous distance from the norm.
But three things keep him from a clean bill.
First, the history. A personal SEC antifraud injunction and $8.28 million disgorgement over accounting fraud allegations, settled without admission in 2000, is not disqualifying twenty-six years later, and it is also not nothing. A $40 million tax settlement in 2024, also without admission, also disputed by him, is likewise not a finding of liability and is likewise not nothing. Neither establishes wrongdoing, and the two settlements are twenty-four years apart and address different subject matter - securities accounting in one case, tax residency in the other - which is too thin a basis to call it a pattern. What the record supports is narrower: two large settlements, neither an admission nor a finding of liability, that belong in the record without being overweighted.
Second, the gap between the message and the mechanism. The public message is simple, absolutist, and emotionally compelling: buy bitcoin, hold forever, never sell. The mechanism is a highly engineered capital structure with $6.71 billion of convertible notes, $15.46 billion of preferred liquidation preference, $1.76 billion of annual cash obligations against a software business generating under $500 million of annual revenue, and a formal board-approved program for selling bitcoin to meet those obligations. The retail investor hears the message. The filings describe the mechanism. Those are not the same product.
Third, the replicability problem. Nothing about what Strategy did is available to an individual. The entire edge was cheap institutional financing and an equity premium to net asset value that could be recycled into more bitcoin. That premium has compressed, the yield metric is decaying, and the company is now a net seller of bitcoin in some weeks. An individual copying the surface behaviour without the financing structure gets the volatility with none of the protection.
Scam score 2 out of 8. That is above zero primarily because of the replicability problem: an individual cannot reproduce a leveraged corporate treasury strategy funded by convertible notes and preferred stock, and a retail investor who mistakes "buy bitcoin, hold forever" for a description of Strategy's actual capital structure is taking on risk the message does not disclose. It is not higher than that because there is no product to be defrauded by, no fabricated credentials, no hidden fees, total regulatory transparency, and the settled enforcement history - while real and worth knowing - carries no admission or finding of liability. Rating 3.4 out of 5.
Read him. Read the filings first.
Sources
All figures in this review come from the documents listed in the sources array: Strategy Inc's Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June 2026 and its Forms 8-K dated 3 August 2026, 6 July 2026, and 29 June 2026, its 2026 definitive proxy statement, and MicroStrategy's Form 8-K of 11 August 2020, all filed with the SEC and retrievable from EDGAR; SEC Litigation Release 16829 and SEC Press Release 2000-186 for the December 2000 settlement; the District of Columbia Attorney General's June 2024 release for the tax settlement; Forbes for net worth; stockanalysis.com for market price data; and public reporting for the MSCI index consultation and Saylor's 2024 conference remarks.
Michael Saylor operates primarily on Twitter/X + Public Company, where they have built an audience of 5M+ followers. Executive chairman of Strategy (formerly MicroStrategy), which held 842,138 BTC at a $75,419 average cost as of August 2026. He sells no course - only a thesis and a listed equity - but carries a settled 2000 SEC fraud injunction and a $40M DC tax settlement. Their content focuses on online income strategies delivered through Twitter/X + Public Company-based courses and programs priced at $0 (no course, coaching, or paid program).
Michael Saylor charges $0 (no course, coaching, or paid program) for their program. When evaluating whether this price is justified, consider: What specific, actionable outcomes does the course promise? Are there free alternatives covering the same material on YouTube or blogs? Does the price include ongoing access, community support, or mentorship? Many Twitter/X + Public Company educators offer similar content at lower price points, so compare before committing.
Michael Saylor has a trust score of 3.4/5 and a scam score of 2/5 based on our independent analysis. Always verify income claims independently, check for a refund policy before purchasing, and look for verified student results rather than testimonials alone.
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